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ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES




The administrative agency has during the last fifty years become
a governmental problem child. Uncontrolled agency powers lead to
bureaucracy. Administrative law sets the controls, by prescribing the
conduct of agency action and providing for review or appeal for ag-
grieved parties. The conscious beginnings of administrative law in this
country were first outlined by Professor Goodnow in his work "Com-
parative Administrative Law", published in 1893.1 With the advent
of the Interstate Commerce Commission 2 and other governmental
agencies, both state and federal, limitations upon agency action, powers
and procedure have been developed by court decisions.
"The power lodged in administrative agencies is the most important
aspect of our government today."3 It invades every activity of our
daily lives. Administrative law has been defined as "simply the pro-
cedure and methods of the executive branch of the government in its
contacts with private interests and provides for judicial checks upon
its authority."4 The field of procedure and evidence at agency hearings
has been the subject of three different theories. The ultra-liberal or
popular theory was outlined by President Roosevelt, in December 1940,
in his veto of the Walter-Logan bill. He said:
"The administrative tribunal or agency has been evolved to
handle controversies arising under particular statutes. It is char-
acteristic of these tribunals that simpler and non-technical hear-
ings take the place of court trials and informal proceedings
* Partner, Cahill and Denery, Attorneys at Law, St. Paul, Minnesota.
1 "Administrative Agencies" by John Schulman (1946). American Bar Associa-
tion Section of Legal Education, Practicing Law Institute.
For the Origin and Development of Administrative Law See 42 Am. Juris.,
p. 291.
2 The Interstate Commerce Commission was created in 1887-id.
3 "The power lodged in administrative agencies is the most important aspect of
our government today. Its growth has been the response to need and not to
malicious usurpation of power. Indeed there have been and continue to be
instances of abuse of administrative discretion but in the course of time
various safeguards have been developed to curb them. The recently adopted
administrative procedure acts by federal and state governments incorporate
some of the safeguards. Whether they are sufficient to secure fair dealing
and democratic participation remains to be seen. "Carrow, Background of
Administrative Law. (1948). p. 19 Associated Lawyers Publishing Company,
Newark, N.J.
4 Another definition given in Mr. Carrow's recent book (supra p. 26) is: "We
might define administrative law as dealing with the powers of administrative
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supersede rigid and formal pleadings and processes. A common
sense resort to usual and practical sources of information takes
the place of archic and technical application of rules of evidence,
and an informed and expert tribunal renders its decision with
an eye that looks forward to results rather than backwards to
precedent and the leading case . . Substantial justice remains
a higher aim for our civilization than technical legalism... Court
procedure is adapted to an intensive investigation of individual
controversies. But it is impossible to subject the daily routine
of fact finding in many of our agencies to court procedure...
Its technical rules of procedure are often traps for the unwary
and technical rules of evidence often prevent common sense de-
terminations on information which would be regarded adequate
for any business decision."'
The courts are passive by nature and act only on motion of counsel.
A lawsuit is like a chess game, success depending largely, if not some-
times altogether, on the astuteness of the prevailing attorney. An
administrative agency makes its own rules, investigates, and if its in-
vestigation shows need for action, summons the parties before it, often
prosecutes or is the complainant, is not hampered by technical rules of
evidence, and comes to a decision with dispatch.Y The agency is both
agencies as they affect persons outside the government, with the processes
with which these powers are exercised and with the controls over such powers
and processes.!
In 1927 Justice (then Professor) Frankfurter defined administrative law as
follows: ". . .administrative law deals with the field of legal control exercised
by law-administering agencies other than the courts, and the field of control
exercised by the courts over such agencies." Frankfurter. The Task of Ad-
ministrative Law. (1927) 75 U. of Pa. Law Rev. 614, 615. The recently adopted
administrative procedure act defines agency as follows: "Sec. 2 (a) Agency
means each authority of the Government of the United States other than
Congress, the courts, or the goverments of the possessions, territories, or the
District of Columbia."
While the bulk of matters coming before administrative agencies are con-
troversies between the government and private persons, there are numerous
matters coming before such agencies that are disputes between individuals
or persons, such as workmen's compensation cases, reparation cases under the
Interstate Commerce Commission between shippers and carriers, and similar
proceedings under state statutes, matters before the National R.R. Adjustment
Board, and representative proceedings before the National Labor Relations
Board.
527 Am. Bar Assoc. Journal 52. President Roosevelt further said in this
message:
"Before the commencement of this administration the Supreme Court
speaking through its present Chief Justice definitely recognized the use-
fulness and constitutionality of the administrative tribunal, referred to
the obvious purpose of the legislation to furnish a prompt, expert and
inexpensive method for dealing with a class of questions which are
peculiarly suited to examination and determination by an administrative
agency assigned to that task."
0In support of the popular theory Mr. Justice Jackson, in an opinion con-
curred in by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in the case of Sec. Exch. Comm. v.
Chenery Corp., 91 L.Ed. 1995, 2004-5 (1947) says: "I have long since urged and
still believe, that the administrative process deserves fostering in our system
as an expeditious and non-technical method of applying law in specializedfields." (emphasis supplied).
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prosecutor, judge and jury. These agencies handle multitudinous small
maters7 in which the parties are not represented by attorneys, at which
hearings, the presiding officials are not trained in the rules of evidence,
such as engineers, physicians, accountants, barbers, beauticians and
numerous specialists none of whom are either lawyers or judges. On
the other hand some agencies handle maters of great magnitude and
importance. A pertinent example of such is the case of Federal Trade
Commission v. Cement Institute.7a This originally was a hearing before
the Federal Trade Commission. Mr. Justice Black in his introductory
statement of facts in the Supreme Court's opinion says:
"These respondents are: The Cement Institute, an unincorpor-
ated trade association composed of 74 corporations which manu-
facture sell and distribute cement, the 74 corporate members of
the institute and 21 individuals who are associated with the In-
stitute. It took three years for a trial examiner to hear the evi-
dence which consists of about 49,000 pages of oral testimony and
50,000 pages of exhibits. Even the findings and conclusions of
the Commission cover 176 pages. The briefs with the accom-
panying appendixes submitted by the parties contain more than
4000 pages." (p. 705)
While the foregoing is probably an extreme case it shows the impor-
tant part that the administrative agency plays in our scheme of govern-
ment especially as its findings are generally for all practical purposes
conclusive.
The historic division of government into legislative, executive and
judicial departments is not clear cut. They often overlap., In the field
of public law, including the regulation of different businesses affecting
the public-the control of health, education, public utilities, insurance,
banking etc.-these agencies legislate and adjudicate, and are not bound
by the strict rules of evidence. The proponents of the popular theory
can amply justify the abandonment of most of the more technical rules
at agency hearings.9
7 The state licenses and regulates numerous trades, professions and personal
activities such as accountants, architects, attorneys, barbers, beauticians, chiro-
practors, chiropodists, dentists, embalmers, osteopaths, pharmasists, physicians,
surveyors, veterinarians, automobile operators, aircraft airmen and airports,
hotels, restaurants, saloons, warehouses and warehousemen, banks, insurance
companies, sale of securities, wholsale liquor dealers, those about to marry,
etc., etc.
7-a333 U.S. 683, 687, S.Ct. 793 (1948).
s Mr. Justice Holmes in Springer v. Phillipine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 209-11
(1928) says: "The ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide
fields of black and white. Even the more specific of them are found to ter-
minate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other... We
do not carry out the distinction between legislative and executive action with
mathematical precision and divide the branches into watertight compartments,
were it ever so desirable to do so."
9Professor Davis writing in the Harvard Law Review in 1942 says: "Almost
everywhere, except in the common law world, the rules of evidence are un-
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The courts are often of necessity obliged to make decisions on
hearsay reports based on investigations made by various welfare, proba-
tionary and other officials, and on other evidence clearly not admissable,
even before a court sitting without a jury. While it is true that Mr.
Roosevelt's theory (the popular theory) would produce dispatch in gov-
ernment business transacted by its agencies and commissions, the indi-
vidual citizen would have little or no protection from possible bureau-
cratic absolutism. The lack of orderly procedure before these agencies,
especially in contested matters, and the limited right of appeal or review,
infringes on the individual's constitutional right of "due process," un-
der the Fifth as well as the Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitu-
tion. The popular theory has been referred to by former Chief Justice
Hughes as personal government rather than government by law.'a
The second or orthodox theory, sometimes called the technical rule,
goes to the other extreme; it prescribes strict rules of evidence at
agency hearings. It has been advocated, at least by reference, by the
conservative justices of the Supreme Court, notably Justices Suther-
land, Butler, Chief Justice Hughes, and by Dean Roscoe Pound'0 of
known. Among English-speaking peoples the rules have developed only in
the last few centuries. In the United States reversals by appellate courts for
erroneous admissions far exceed those in England... The detective, the banker,
the physicist, the statistician, the investigator find facts without formality and
without rules. No pretense is made of applying the rules of evidence in many
hearings conducted by private arbitrators, private associations, social case
workers, labor arbitrators, and international arbitral tibunals. Even in couts,
the findings made without the application of the rules of evidence are far
more numerous than is customarily recognized. Juvenile courts, municipal
courts, police courts, summary courts, and the like, are frequently quite un-
aware of the otherdox rules. Admiralty courts, especially in prize cases,
frankly reject the idea of formal rules of evidence. In the ordinary law and
equity courts, state and federal, the use of affidavits in granting ordinary re-
straining orders and temporary injunctions is familiar and interlocutory ques-
tions of fact of various kinds are often decided on the basis of evidence which
the rules would exclude. Grand juries in many jurisdictions may consider all
evidence that comes to their attention, relevant and irrelevant. In various
administrative duties, instructing or discharging fiducaries, for example, judges
act upon information made available to them. In habeas corpus and extradi-
tion cases there are immense bodies of authority to the effect that though
liberty of the person is involved, decisions may be based upon affidavits and
ex-parte statements, dispensing to that extent with the right of cross-examin-
ation. And most amazing of all (to me shocking) is the seemingly universal
practice of acting on unsworn statements, or affidavits or secret information
and denying the right of introducing rebuttal evidence when the judge of a
criminal court finds facts in order to fix the sentence of a convicted defendant.
The finding may make the difference between a suspended sentence and a
twenty year term in the penitentiary and yet the defendant may be denied,
even the opportunity of knowing the nature of the decisive evidence and the
opportunity to rebut it. A combing of the opinions upholding these practices
yields as a sole justification... that sentencing is a matter of discretion of the
trial judge and therefore the rules of evidence need not apply. The bulk of
agency business in broad way more nearly resembles the functions whichjudges exercise without regard for the traditional rules." 55 Harvard Law Rev.
364, 367-9 (1942).
9a See note 11 post.
10 Dean Pound reviewing the annual survey of American Law (1944) says:
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the Harvard Law School. Justice Hughes, in 1920, in a public address,
referring to such agencies said that "they represent to a striking degree
a prevalent desire to do without law."11
In the last fifty years administrative agencies, both state and federal,
have encroached to an alarming extent on the domain of private law.
These agencies make findings of fact, 2 that are generally not review-
able. Where review is taken, their findings, even as to the application
of the statute, are accepted as the informed opinions of specialized ex-
perts. They are a fourth department of the government, with a law
unto themselves, and are subject to political pressure1 3 more so than
the courts. Mr. Justice Sutherland, speaking for the court in the
Jones case, 4 said that "our institutions must be kept free from the
appropriations of unauthorized power" by those lesser agencies. Mr.
Justice Hughes in the St. Joseph's Stockyards Co. case said: "Legisla-
tive agencies with varying qualifications, work in a field peculiarly
exposed to political demands. They may be expert and impartial, others
subservient."
"Even more significant is the marked preponderence of public and adminis-
trative law-of determinations of administrative agencies and officers affect-
ing everyday rights of individuals over the law applied by the courts govern-
ing private relations. The survey as a whole suggests Jenning's proposition
that in the English-speaking world public law is swallowing private law. Also
the reviews of the different subjects seem to reflect a steady growth of extra-
legal if not lawless exercise of official power and rise of official absolutism.
In connection with the tendency to concede the widest power and freedom
from official scrutiny to administrative agencies, this suggests a change in our
policy in the direction of centralized absolutism. In the same direction the
decisions show a tendency to extreme interpretations and to accept extreme
interpretations made by administrative agencies," 33 Am.B.Assoc. J. 1093-1095
(1947) (Italics added).
""The practice of government is rapidly changing before our eyes and as yet
the movement is largely without guidance or principle. With respect to, ac-
tivities of the first importance, we are turning to what within limits is personal
government, relieved of the scrutiny and supervision heretofore demanded as
the traditional safeguard of justice. The movement has a wholesome motive
in the desire to escape technicalities, to secure an expertness in dealing with
complicated problems which could be expected only through a body informed
by continuous experience in a limited field, and to promote efficiency by ob-
taining a play for the common sense view, the direct approach and the im-
mediate and unhampered decision. Ignoring the distinctions prized by the
fathers and excusing the violation of tradition by easily made phrases, we
unite legislative, executive and judicial powers in an administrative agency,
with large spheres of uncontrolled discretion, which may investigate and lay
complaint, and then try and determine facts upon which the complaint rests,
their findings of fact where there is any dispute in the evidence, being made
for many purposes conclusive. Useful as are these instrumentalities of ad-
ministration, they represent to a striking degree a prevalent desire to do
without law. There is thus recourse of the primitive method in dealing with
the most difficult problems of the 20th century" Justice Hughes statement as
reported in the Boston Transcript of June 21, 1920.
12 "the factual findings made in the administrative proceeding will not be re-
viewed by the courts if any reasonable support exists in the record." John
Schulman, Supra.
23 St. Joseph's Stockyards Co. v. U.S., 298 U.S. 38, 51-54 (1936).
1Jones v. Security & Exchange, 298 U.S. 23-35; 80 L.Ed. 1015 (1936).
[Vol. 34
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
The objection to the technical rule is that it is impractical. The
administrative agency is often necessarily composed entirely of laymen
who have no knowledge of the rules of evidence, and as Judge Dibell
of the Minnesota Supreme Court aptly said, in the Hardstone Brick
Co. case ::4a
"It is a mistake to suppose a conclusion can not be reached
safely by administrative bodies unless they proceed in accordance
with jury trial rules of evidence... Most of the world's work is
done without... There was ample evidence the admissibility of
which can not be questioned in such a proceeding as this to sus-
tain the findings of the commission... The court can make but
a limited review of the determination of the department. If it
keeps within its jurisdiction and its action is not arbitrary or
oppressive or unreasonable or without evidence to support it the
the court can not interfere... How far courts should go in per-
mitting evidence not receivable in common law trials is in part
a question of policy... The departmennt went far afield. In no
event was the relator prejudiced. The result reached by the de-
partment was practically the necessary one."
The third or modem theory as to the field of the administrative
agency, which admits a just basis for the popular as well as for the
technical theory, is a compromise.15 "The courts and administrative
agencies are collaborative instrumentalities of justice and not business
rivals."' Congress and some state legislatures,1 7 have through their
uniform administrative acts provided for a fair hearing, upon due no-
tice, reasonably probative evidence, right of review and protection of
the individual from the "official absolutism" referred to by Dean
Pound.'
In 1939 Chief Justice Stone 9 advocated collaboration between court
14a State ex rel Hardstone Brick Co. v. Department of Commerce, 174 Minn.
200-203, 219 N.W. 81 (1928).
15 Professor Wigmore suggests a compromise between the popular and the
technical theories, See Vol. 1, Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd ed. page 27-43.16 The modern school philosophy is epitomized by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in
in U.S. v. Ruziska, 91 L.Ed. 290 (Dec. 16, 1945) where he says: "Both courts
and administrative bodies are law enforcing agencies, utilized by congress as
such. In construing the enforcement provisions of legislation like the Mar-
keting Act, it is important to remember that the courts and administrative
agencies are collaborative 'instrumentalities of justice' and not business rivals."
17 The Wisconsin Act provides (Wis. Stat. 227.10-1) that agencies shall not be
bound by common law rules of evidence but shall admit all testimony having
reasonably probative value; "but shall exclude irrelevant or unduly repetitious
testimony .. .Basic principles of relevancy, materiality and probative force, as
recognized in equitable proceedings, shall govern the proof of all questions
of fact."
The North Dakota Act (N.D.Stat. 28:3206) provides that in agency hearings
the common law rules of evidence may be waived "if such waiver is neces-
sary to ascertain the substantial rights of all the parties" but that only evi-
dence of probative value shall be accepted.
18 See note 10, supra.
19 In the third Morgan case (U.S. v. Morgan, 307 U.S. 191, 1939) the court said:
"...in construing a statute setting up an administrative agency and provid-
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and agency. The tendency on review of administrative decisions is
a liberal one20 as long as the constitutional rights of the individual are
are preserved. Even legal inferences, according to the later decisions,21
will not be disturbed, if based upon substantial evidence and are not
contrary to law.
Regarding the field of the administrative agency, Professor Brown2
says:
"We are undoubtedly at a critical time in the growth of adminis-
trative law. The great advances now being made in govern-
mental control of private industry and business undoubtedly call
for a greater reliance on administrative agencies as instruments
of control and even in the traditional field of legislative and judi-
cial action there is an increasing demand for conferring upon ad-
ministrative tribunals the functions formerly performed by leg-
islatures and courts. Up to the present time, unfortunately this
system of administrative lawmaking and adjudication has large-
ly, like Topsy, 'just growed'. As new needs have developed, new
executive tribunals have been created to meet them.. .the present
development is a singularly haphazard and unplanned thing, with
far too little attention being paid to principles and details of
organization and procedure, which aim to secure that proper
balance between public demands and private right, without which
no governmental agency deserves to exist." (italics supplied)
ing for judicial review of its action, court and agency are not to be regarded
as wholly independent and unrelated instrumentalities of justice each acting
in the performance of its prescribed statutory duty without regard to the
appropriate function of the other in securing the plainly indicated objects of
the statute. Court and agency are the means adopted to maintain the pre-
scribed end as their duties are defined by the words of the statute, these words
should be construed so as to attain that end through coordinated action.
Neither body should repeat in this day the mistake made by the courts of law
when equity was struggling for recognition as an ameliorating system of jus-
tice. Neither can rightly be regarded by the other as an alien intruder, to be
tolerated if it must be, but never to be encouraged or aided by the other in
the attainment of the common end." (emphasis supplied).
201n N.L.R.Bd. v. Donnelly Garment Co., 91 L.Ed. 584.867 (1947) Mr. Justice
Frankfurter says: "Even in judicial trials, the whole tendency is to leave the
rulings as to the illuminating relevence of testimony largely to the discretion
of the trial court who hears the evidence... Courts of appeal are less inclined
to base error on such rulings. Administrative tribunals are given freer scope
in the application of the conventional rules of evidence."
21 ustice Murphy in Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Inv. Co., 91 L.Ed. 1028, 1036-37
(1947) says: "It is likewise immaterial that the facts permit the drawing of
diverse inferences. The Deputy Commissioner is charged with the duty of
initially selecting the inference which is most reasonable and his choice if
otherwise sustainable, may not be disturbed by a reviewing court, . . even if
such an inference be considered 7nore legal than factual in nature, the review-
ing courts' function is exhausted when it becomes evident that the Deputy
Commissioner's choice has substantial roots in the evidence and is not for-
bidden by law. Such is the result of the statutory provision forbidding sus-
pension of compensation orders only 'if not in accordance with law'. Our
attention must therefore be cast upon the inference drawn by the Deputy Com-
missioner in this case that Ticer's injury and death did arise out of and in
the course of his employment. If there is factual and legal support for that
conclusion our task is at an end." (italics supplied).
22 "Administrative Commissions and the Judicial Power." Ray A. Brown, Pro-
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Administrative agencies are neither courts nor legislative bodies. They
legislate and adjudicate. They "are delegated specific jobs relating
to a particular subject in the course of which it may be necessary to
settle disputes adjudicatively or make subsidiary interpretations of
policies or both." 23 Their task is a unitary process in which the ad-
judicative and legislative or rule making functions often coalesce, and
in such proceedings the courts hold that "due process" requires the
formalities of judicial procedure except where the agency action is
purely the making of rules and regulations. 24
Findings of fact by an administrative body may be declared by
statute to be conclusive. If proper procedural requirements have been
taken and if the findings are supported by substantial evidence there
is no violation of due process. 25
Hearsay evidence alone uncorrobated by competent testimony will
not support a finding except in complicated cases of a specialized na-
ture, where it is practically the only evidence available.2 As to judi-
cial notice 7 administrative agencies may notice the same facts as courts
and in addition thereto matters of common knowledge in their spe-
cialized field and from their experience in handling similar cases. As to
fessor of Law, University of Wisconsin, (Feb. 1935) 19 Minn. Law Rev. 261,
263.
2 Carrow op.cit. p. 35-36. Morgan v. U.S., 468, 479-480 (1936).24
"Because of the different constitutional requirements imposed by the courts
on what they designate as a process of a judicial nature as distinguished from
from one of a legislative nature, it is necessary to keep rule making and ad-
judication as distinct as possible. The Federal Administrative Procedure Act
treats them in separate sections and provides for somewhat different pro-
cedures, although several statutes require that the agency conduct its rule
making like those of a political tribunal." Carrow, op. cit. p. 36.25 In a concurring opinion in St. Joseph's Stockyards Co. v. U.S., 298 U.S. 77,
72-73, (1936) Mr. Justice Brandies says: "Is there anything in the constitu-
tion which expressly makes findings of fact by a jury of inexperienced lay-
men, if supported by substantial evidence, conclusive, that prohibits congress
making findings of fact by a highly trained and especially qualified adminis-
trative agency likewise conclusive, provided they are supported by substantial
evidence. The inexorable safeguard which the due process clause assures us
is, not that a court may examine whether the findings as to the value or in-
come are correct, but that the trier of facts shall be an impartial tribunal;
that no finding shall be made except upon due notice and opportunity to be
heard; that the procedure at the hearing shall be consistent with the essentials
of a fair trial; that it shall be conducted in such a way that there will be
opportunity for a court to determine whether the applicable rules of law and
procedure were observed."
20Hoyt, Some Practical Problems met in the Trial of Cases before Adminis-
trative Tribunals, (1941) 25 Minn. Law Rev. 545-551. He says: "Summarizing
the present state of the law with respect to the admissibility of hearsay testi-
mony before the administrative tribunals, it can probably be said with safety
that the mere admission of such testimony is not reversible error, but that the
use of such testimony as the sole basis for a vital finding, through permitted in
small minority of states, is generally frowned upon by the state and federal
courts, except where the fact to be proved is of so complicated a character
that some degree of hearsay is practically a necessity."
27 id. p. 554.
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the use of ex-parte investigations2 8 of agency officials, they can not
be used as a basis for a decision unless made a part of the record, and
subject to cross-examination. Regardless of the admission of incompe-
tent evidence, including uncorrobated hearsay or unauthorized judicial
notice, if there is substantial evidence to support the findings, the re-
viewing court will not interfere, unless the erroneous testimony was
clearly prejudicial. 29
The administrative agency may go farther than determine the facts;
it may declare a new principle based on its specialized experience, if
there is substantial evidence to support it, and the determination is
reasonable and within the authority of the agency under the statute
creating it.30 Agency regulations and interpretations of the statute are
given respect and due consideration by the courts and sometimes "de-
cisive weight."' '
Where the agency makes a determination that is reasonable and
fair, the court will not disturb it, if the agency acts within its delegated
2 8 id. p. 554-558. Interstate Comm. Comm. v. L. & N. R. Co., 227 U.S. 88 (1913).
2 id. p. 558-559.30 In Securities Exc. Com. v. Chenery Corp. 91 L.Ed. 1995, 2004-5 (1947), the
court says: "The scope of our review of an administrative order is no differ-
ent from that which pertains to ordinary administrative action. The wisdom
of the principle adopted is none of our concern. Our duty is at an end where
it becomes evident that the Commission's action is based upon substantial evi-
dence and is consistent with the authority granted by Congress... We are un-
able to say in this case that the Commission erred in reaching the result it
did. The facts being undisputed we are free to disturb the Commissioner's
conclusions only if it lacks any rational and statutory foundation. In that
connection the Commissioner made a thorough examination of the problem,
utilizing statutory standards and its own accummulated experience with re-
organization matters. In essence it has made what we indicated in our prior
opinion would be informed, expert judgment on the problem. It has taken
into account 'those more subtle factors in the marketing of utility securities
that gave rise to the very evils that the Public Utility Holding Company Act
of 1935 was designed to correct' and has relied upon the fact that the 'abuse
of corporate position, influence and access to information may arise questions
so subtle that the law can deal with them effectively, only by prohibitions not
concerned with the fairness of a particular transaction." In Dobson v. Comm.
of Int. Rev., 320 U.S. 489, 502 (1943) the court says: "In deciding law questions
courts may properly attach weight to the decision of points of law by an
administrative body having special competence to deal with the subject matter.
The Tax Court is informed by experience and kept current with tax evolution
and need by the volume and variety of its work. While its decisions may not
be binding precedents for courts dealing with similar problems, uniform ad-
ministration would be promoted by conforming to them where possible."
31 In Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 89 L.Ed. Adv. Ops., 125-128, 323 U.S. 134-140,
(1944) Mr. Justice Jackson says: "The fact that the administrators policies
and standards are not reached by trial in adversary form does not mean that
they are not entitled to respect. This court has long given considerable and
in some cases decisive weight to Treasury decisions and to interpretative regu-
lations of the Treasury and other bodies that are not of adversary origin.
We consider the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator
under the Act (Fair Labor Standards Act) while not controlling upon the
courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and
informed judgment to which the courts and litigants may properly resort for
guidance." See Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 124.
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power, (i.e. has jurisdiction), and there is no question of constitutional
right.32
In administrative hearings, while the technical rules of evidence,
are not binding, the agency findings must be based on reasonably pro-
bative testimony and not on mere rumor or uncorroborated hearsay.33
The doctrine of res adjudicata does not apply to decisions of adminis-
trative agencies . 4
The application of the modern theory as to hearings before govern-
mental agencies is exemplified in the case of Federal Trade Commission
32 In the case of Interstate Comm. Comm. v. Illinois, 215 U.S. 452, (1910) Mr.
Justice White speaking for the court, said: "The statute endowing the com-
mission with large administrative functions and generally giving effect to its
order concerning complaints brought before it without exacting that they be
previously submitted to judicial authority for sanction, it became necessary to
determine the extent of the powers which the court may exert on the subject.
Beyond controversy in determining whether an order of the commissioner
shall be suspended or set aside we must consider: (a) all relevant questions
of constitutional power or right; (b) all pertinent questions as to whether
the administrative order is within the scope of the delegated authority under
which it purports to have been made; and (c) a proposition which we state
independently, although in its essence, it may be contained in the previous one,
viz, whether even if the order is made in form within the delegated power,
the exertion of authority which is questioned has been manifested in such an
unreasonable manner as to come in truth to be within the elementary rule
that the substance and not the shadow determine the validity of the exercise
of the power .. Plain as it is that the powers just stated are the essence ofjudicial authority and which therefore may not be curtailed, and whose dis-
charge may not be by us in a proper case avoided, it is equally plain that such
perennial powers lend no support whatever to the proposition that we may
under the guise of exerting political power usurp merely administrative func-
tions by setting aside a lawful administrative order upon our own conception
as to whether the administrative power has been wisely exercised. Power to
make the order and not the mere expediency or wisdom of having made it
is the question."
33 In the case of Consolidated Edison Co. v. N.L.R.Bd., 305 U.S. 197 (1938)
Chief Justice Hughes says: "The companies urged that the board received
'remote hearsay' and mere rumor. The statute provides that 'the rules of evi-
dence prevailing in the courts of law and equity sall not be controlling.' The
obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards
from the compulsion of the technical rules so that the mere submission of
matter which would be deemed incompetent in judicial proceedings would not
invalidate the administrative order. But this assurance of a desired flexibility
in administrative procedure does not go so far as to justify orders without
basis in the evidence having rational probative force. Mere uncorroborated
hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence." In the case of
N.L.R.Bd. v. Remington Rand Co., 94 Fed. 2nd 862-873, (1938) Circuit Judge
Hand says: "The examiner was quite within his powers in examining the
witnesses; a judge often does. He did admit much that would have been ex-
cluded at common law, but the act specifically so provides. . .no doubt that
does not mean that mere rumor will serve to support a finding, but hearsay
may do so, at least if more is not conveniently available, and if in the end
the finding is supported by the kind of evidence on which responsible persons
are accustomed to rely in serious affairs."
34 State ex rel Zoning Board of Appeals (Wisconsin, 1948), 35 N.W. (2nd) 312.
The doctrine of res adjudicata does not apply to decisions of administrative
bodies. See also Duel v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 1 N.W. 2nd 887, 2
N.W. 2nd 871. In the latter case the court says: "The extent of the power of
an administrative agency to reconsider its own findings has nothing to do
with res adjudicata; the latter doctrine applies solely to courts."
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v. Cement Institute, 4a where Mr. Justice Black speaking for the court
says:
"Administrative agencies like the Federal Trade. Commission
have never been restricted by the rigid rules of evidence. . .and
of course rules which bar certain types of evidence in criminal
and quasi-criminal cases are not controlling in proceedings like
this where the effect of the Commission's order is not to punish
or to fasten liability on respondents for past conduct but to ban
specific practices for the future in accordance with the general
mandate of Congress.. .We sustain the Commission's holding...
In doing so we give great weight to the Commission's conclusion,
as this court has done in other cases. In the Keppel case the
court called attention to the express intention of Congress to
create an agency whose membership would at all times be ex-
perienced, so that its conclusions would be the result of an ex-
pertness coming from experience. We are persuaded that the
Commission's long and close examination of the questions it
has decided have provided it with precisely the experience that
fits it for the performance of its statutory duty. The kind of
specialized knowledge Congress wanted its agency to have was
an expertness that would fit it to stop at the threshold every un-
fair trade practice-that kind of practice, which if left alone
destroys competition and establishes monopoly."
In this case the Court of Appeals reversed the Federal Trade Com-
mission, and the Supreme Court reversed the Circuit Court of Appeals
and approved the findings of the commission.
The expertness of the administrative agency in its own peculiar
field is not only given great weight by the courts but it has been held
that the agency may disregard expert testimony given before it, if
such testimony is contrary to the expert experience of the agency. 4b
There are however some courts who do not subscribe to this doc-
trine. In a recent federal case34C Circuit Judge Clark, reversing an
affirmance of an order of the Patent Office, says:
"The majority of this court are of the opinion that the learned
trial court takes altogether too narrow a view of its own juris-
diction. It proceeds upon the theory that the case is one for
the strict and extreme application of the doctrine of adminis-
trative finality which might better be known as 'administrative
infallibility.' But whatever may be one's opinion of this doctrine,
it has no possible application in this case. . .The whole theory
of administrative finality stems from the assumption that the ad-
ministrative agency is composed of 'experts', in many instances
a most erroneous assumption."
34a333 U.S. 683 (1948).
34b McCarthy v. Industrial Comm., (Wis., 1927), 215 N.W. 824.




The recent federal "Administrative Procedure Act" was initially
prepared and sponsored by the American Bar Association. The title
to the act is significant. It is "An act to improve the Administration
of Justice by prescribing Fair Administrative Procedure." (Italics sup-
plied). The committees of the association had been working on this
subject several years prior to 1946, when the association persuaded
Congress that the procedure in hearings before federal agencies needed
revamping in order to secure for the individual a fair hearing. The
act3 5 provides for public information by publication in the Federal
Register of the scope of the agency's powers, methods of procedure,
rules and availability of its records for public inspection. That notice
of proposed rule making be published; that interested parties be able
to participate in rule making; that no rule take effect until thirty days
after publication. In adjudicative matters requirements are due notice,
pleadings and a hearing; written findings with reasons therefor, arrived
at by 'reliable, probative evidence'38 on consideration of the entire
record; adjudication being separate and independent of the investiga-
tive and prosecution function; decisions to be made by hearing officers
or upon the record submitted with argument; ample provision for re-
view which may compel agency action delayed, or set aside the same
when arbitrary, contrary to constitutional right, in excess of jurisdic-
tion, not supported by substantial evidence, all with due regard to the
prejudicial error rule. Declaratory rulings may be made.
During the past twenty years there has been a growing demand for
improvement in state agency proceedings to secure therein a proper
balance between public interest and protection of private right. In 1930
the Governor of New York appointed Mr. Benjamin to study the ad-
ministrative agencies of that state.3 7 The American Bar Association
from 1933 to 1936 through its special committees submitted recom-
mendations for the improvement of administrative procedure, both
state and federal. In 1939 the Association's committee prepared a uni-
form state act covering the basic principles of fair administrative pro-
cedure.38 Using this act as a pattern the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws, as its October, 1946, meeting, ap-
proved the Model State Procedure Act. This Act or the previous
association act has been enacted by about a dozen states.2 9
85 60 Stat. 237; U.S.C.A. sec. 1001 et seq. (1946); amended Pub.L.No.663, 79th
Congress, 2d Session, sec. 302 (Aug. 8, 1946).
"'Sec. 7. (c).
3 See Benjamin, "Administrative Adjudication in the State of New York, (1942).
38 Am. Bar Assoc. Reports for 1933 to 1939, inc.
39 California, Illinois, Indiana, North Dakota, North Caroline, Ohio, Pa., Mo. and
Wisconsin. The uniform state act prepared by the Bar Assoc. committee was
adopted in Wisconsin and Ohio in 1943; in N.D. 1941. This was before the
adoption of the model state act by the Comm's. on Uniform State Laws.
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The state act attempts to cover only the fundamental principles of
fair play and common sense that should have uniform application in
state agency hearings and procedure. It consists of only thirteen sec-
tions, not including the usual formal sections of severability, repeals
and time of taking effect. It covers the legislative phase of agency
action, that in rule making, notice to be given to interested parties with
opportunity for a hearing and to advice as to the propriety and neces-
sity of particular rules, and that new rules may be proposed, as also
amendments to existing rules; that arhple publication be made. That
the validity of a rule may be passed upon by the appropriate court;
and that the agency make declaratory rulings as to the application of
a rule to a specific fact situation. The model act covers the judicial
phase of agency action by providing for due notice, reasonable rules
of evidence, and written findings40 made by the examiner who heard
the testimony; and finally adequate and uniform provision for review.
III.
The Minnesota Statute devotes only nine sections to administrative
procedure as such.41 State agencies are empowered to make and
amend rules, upon notice and public hearing. Agency regulations are
subject to approval of the attorney general, are filed with the secretary
of state, and with the clerks of each District Court in the state; and
are to have the force of law. The attorney general, the secretary of
state and the commissioner of administration are constituted a publi-
cation board, charged with the compilation of periodic publications of
agency rules and regulations; they being entitled to judicial notice
and a rebuttable presumption of validity. There is no statutory pro-
vision for procedure or evidence in contested cases, for declaratory
rulings, or that the official who signs the findings have knowledge of
the record, or that official notice be taken of generally accepted facts
within the specialized knowledge of the agency. No provision is made
for review except as may be prescribed in the act creating the agency.
Redress can be had in most cases by certiorari, mandamus, prohibition,
40 The practice of responsible agency heads who are not familiar with the evi-
dence "rubber stamping" the findings of a subordinate is condemned by the
courts. In Morgan v. U.S., 568. (1936) Chief Justice Hughes says: "The
weight ascribed by law to the findings-their conclusiveness when made within
the sphere of the authority conferred-rests upon the assumption that the officer
making the findings had addressed himself to the evidence and upon the evi-
dence has conscientiously reached the conclusions which he deems it to justify.
That duty can not be performed by one who has not considered the evidence
or argument. It is not an impersonal obligation. It is a duty akin to that of
a judge. The one who decides must hear." See also Kaegi v. Industrial Com-
mission, 285 N.W. 845 (Wis., 1939).
411945 Minn. Stat. 15.041 to 15.049 inc.; Laws 1945, Chap. 452 and 459.
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quo warranto, or other of the extraordinary remedies. Available re-
view of adverse agency action is often a matter of grave uncertainty."1"
It is doubtful that the Minnesota Statute42 covers contested cases.
The Minnesota State Bar Association in 1946 adopted the following
resolution:
"Be it resolved, that the Minnesota State Bar Association
favors the passage by the Legislature of an act abolishing the
writs of certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition... and substitut-
ing therefore, a simple practice act based upon petition and
order."
The State Bar's administrative law committee, reporting to the 1948
convention, advocated he exactment of "A well rounded administra-
tive code which would include at least procedure for the issuance of
declaratory rulings and review thereof and uniform and simple pro-
cedure for judicial review in contested cases."
This committee prepared an administrative procedure act which
was presented to the 1949 legislature, but it died in committee. This
proposed act falls far short of "a well rounded code." In agency hear-
ings it permits opinion as well as hearsay evidence and makes no pro-
vision for declaratory rulings43 or a simplified form of review.
IV.
In Minnesota as far back as 1913, it was recognized that the state
administrative departments needed reorganization and simplification.
A commission was appointed to study the 75 different government
agencies in the interest of efficiency and economy. The commission's
report to the 1915 legislature brought no results. Nothing further was
done until the 1923 legislature appointed an interim committee which
studied the reorganization plans of different states and as a result made
41a The scope of the extraordinary remedies is so uncertain that lawyers often
employ two or more of such means of review to be sure they are not thrown
out of court on technical grounds. As a recent example of this where both
certiorari and mandamus were used on the same set of facts see the two cases:
State ex rel Spurck v. Civil Service Board, 32 N.W. (2d) 574, (June 11, 1948) ;
State ex rel Spurck v. Civil Service Board, 32, N.W. (2d) 583, (June 11, 1948).
42The only reference in the Minnesota Statute to contested cases is a single
sentence, under the heading of, "Rules and Regulations".. ."They (the agen-
cies) shall prescribe reasonable notice, a fair hearing, findings of fact based
upon substantial evidence'. . .Minnesota should adopt the Wisconsin Act which
is an entire chapter of the Wisconsin Statutes and a very complete and scien-
tific administrative code, being Chapter 227 of the Wisconsin Statutes.
43 It is probable that the Minnesota Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act (M.S.A.
555.01 and 555.05) would empower the District Court to pass on the validity
of an agency rule or regulation, and also as to the applicability of a regula-
tion to a given situation on the application of an interested party. Most
Minnesota agencies have adopted rules of procedure and have filed them with
the secretary of state, but the official publication board has never functioned
for the reason that the general publication and editing of the rules would cost




a report to the 1925 legislature." This committee recommended the
Massachusetts system for a department of administration having fiscal
management of all state agencies; the establishment of civil service;
control of departmental purchases and expenditures; approval of all
contracts; the making of the biennial budget; the purchase of all sup-
plies and equipment for all state agencies and institutions; that the
then 92 existing boards and agencies be consolidated into a few major
departments. The 1925 legislature,- 5 pursuant to this report, made a
reorganization, by centralizing in the department of administration
financial control of all state agencies; created an executive council and
13 administrative departments.
A second reorganization act was passed in 193948 which made minor
changes in the 1925 general plan. The department of administration
was placed under the control of a single commissioner of administra-
tion, who under the 1939 law became general business manager, budget
commissioner, and purchasing agent for all state agencies, commissions,
boards and institutions. Some of the original departments were reclas-
sified and there were created a department of Public Examiner, a
department of Social Security, including divisions of Public Institu-
tions, of Social Welfare and of Employment and Security, and a De-
partment of Taxation.
The only state agencies4 7 not under the control of the Commissioner
-"After a fierce battle in the legislature the reorganization bill was passed, after
it had been considerably modified, and in the opinion of many competent
critics, very much weakened. Not much was done in the way of eliminating
useless and obselete state functions or in making regroupings in the interest
of efficiency. The outstanding achievement is the creation of administrative
and financial control." Prof. Young, 10 Minn. Rev. Laws, 40-44 (see Laws
1925.c.426). Justice Stone in the case of State ex. rel. v. Poirer, 189 Minn. 200,
201, 203, (1933) speaking of the 1925 act said: "The law of 1925 intended
a thorolgh going reorganization. Expressly by Art. I, sec. 1, 'all of said de-
partments and all officials of state government' were subjected to the new
law. By Art. II sec. 2, all inconsistent former legislation are superseded,
modified, or amended to conform to and give full force and effect to the provi-
sions of this act'. . .The purpose of the law of 1925 was so to organize and
simplify the state government as to make it safe for the taxpayer. It was to
be achieved through consolidating departments and increasing the power and
consequently the responsibility of the governor for management of the state's
business. The members of the dominating commission of the administration
and finance serve at his pleasure. Art. III sec. 2. The thought was that the
centralization of responsibility in the governor, more than anything else, would
result in economy of administration and celerity and economy of needed
action."45 Minn. Laws 1925, Chap. 426.
46 Laws of 1939, Chap. 431 and 441.
The above mentioned reorganization acts of 1925 and 1939 have given to
Minnesota a streamlined organization of its administrative agencies, which
has set up those agencies in logical and related groupings, has centered re-
sponsibility in a relatively small number of key officials resulting in economy to
the taxpayer and efficiency in the conduct of the state's business.
47 The major administrative departments are:
Executive Council (State Board of Investment, M.S.A. 15.01, 9001 to 23)
Department of Administration (M.S.A.16.01 to 16.62)
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of Administration are the state university, municipal corporations, and
political subdivisions of the state, and professional and regulatory
examining and licensing boards.
The plan of Minnesota's administrative agencies starts at the top
with the elected constitutional officers; the governor, lieutenant gov-
ernor, secretary of state, attorney general, auditor and treasurer. Then
come the executive council, and the department of administration, pre-
sided over by the commissioner of administration. 8 This is followed
Department of Agriculture, Dairy and Food (1945 M.S.A. 17.01 to 17.34)
Department of Civil Service (1945 M.S.A. 43.01 to 43.36)
Department of Commerce (Divisions of Banking, Insurance and Securities)
Department of Conservation (Divisions of Forestry, Game and Fish, Drainage
and Waters, Lands and Minerals, M.S.A. 84.01-84.42)
Department of Education (Chaps. 128-130, 131, 132, 133, M.S.A. 1945)
Department of Health (Minn. Stat. Chaps. 145, 146, 147, 148.)
Department of Highways (M.S.A. 169.01 to 169.97)
Department of Labor and Industry, (M.S.A. 175.01 to 175.37)
Department of Public Examiner (M.S.A. 215.01 to .25)
Department of Social Security (Divisions of Public Institutions,
Social Welfare, and Employment and Security.)
Department of Taxation (Board of Tax Appeals M.S.A. 270.01 to .26)
Railroad and Warehouse Commission (M.S.A. 216.01 to .68)
University of Minnesota, a Constitutional corporation; not subject to the De-
partment of Administration-State v. Uni. of Minn., 175 Minn.
259 (1928)
University of Minnesota, a Constitutional corporation; not subject to the De-
Other State Agencies (1945 Minn. Stat. Appendix 7.) Adjudant General, De-
partment of Aeornautics, Bureau of Criminal Apprehension, Liquor Control
Commission, Rural Credit Conservator, Soldiers Home Board, Dept. of Vet-
erans Affairs, Athletic Commission, Board of Grain Appeals, Great Lakes &
St Lawrence Tidewater Commission, State Historical Society, Minn. Re-
sources Commission, Parole Board, Pardon Board, Upper Mississippi & St.
Croix Improvement Commission, also examining boards for accountancy,
architects, engineers and land surveyors, barbers, basic sciences, chiropdy,
chiropractic examiners, dental examiners, electricity, hairdressing and beauty
culture, medical examiners, nurses, optometry, osteopyty, pharmacy, veterinary,
examining board, watchmaking, law examiner, youth conservation commission,
and other commissions and associations.
48 The executive council consists of the governor, the secretary of state, the
attorney general, the auditor and the treasurer. The executive council hasjurisdiction over the investments of state funds, depositaries of state funds,
over state timber, mineral lands, settlement of claims as to land granted by
the United States subject to confirmation by the legislature, relief of distressed
school districts, issuance and sale of state bonds and certificates of indebted-
ness and emergency relief (M.S.A. 9.01 to 9.28). The state board of invest-
ment consists of the governer, state treasurer, state auditor, attorney general,
and one of the regents of the University appointed from the board of regents.
It has control and investment of school funds, permanent university fund,
swamp land fund and other permanent trust funds of the state; also teachers
insurance and retirement fund. (M.S.A. 11.01 to 11.09) The commissioner of
administration is purchasing agent and general business manager for all state
agencies, is charged with the purchase of all supplies, materials, equipment,
printing, utility services for all state institutions, to maintain, operate super-
vize and control all state buildings; to prepare the biennial budget (under
the supervision of the governor), to operate the allotment system; to approve
all contracts and appropriations for state agencies. (M.S.A. 16.01 to 16.62)
The public examiner is general auditor for all state agencies, officers and in-
stitutions. He shall audit the books of the state treasurer, and shall exercise a
constant supervision over all public offices, agencies, institutions and all the
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by the other administrative departments, the heads of which are ap-
pointed by the governor with the approval of the senate, the only
exception being an elective railroad and warehouse commission.
V.
The Minnesota decisions defining the field of agency hearing and
procedure adopt the modern 9 or compromise theory above defined;
also the substantial evidence rule. The extent of the review of admin-
istrative findings is limited to whether there was a denial of constitu-
tional right (including due process), whether the agency had juris-
diction, and whether its action was arbitrary or basically unfair50 The
admissibility of incompetent testimony does not vitiate agency decision,
if there is sufficient competent evidence to support the findings. 5' Re-
fusal to consider competent evidence is fatal, if it was such as could
have affected the result. The credibility or weight of evidence can not
be passed upon review. Agency expertness in its field is given con-
siderable weight.5 2 Agency action may be compelled by mandamus,
even though its findings may not thereby be controlled.
The scope of agency review in Minnesota is tersely stated in State
v. Ienson 3 as follows:
"In reviewing the determinations of administrative boards, such
as the optometry board, this court will inquire no farther than
to determine whether the board kept within its jurisdiction,
divisions of the state government including counties, municipalities, school
districts, towns and villages. He shall recommend systems of accounting and
report irregularities and unbusinesslike practices to the governor, the legis-
lature and to the department affected. (M.S.A. Chap. 215).
49 State v. G.N.Ry.Co., 130 Minn. 57 (1915) ; State ex rel City of Ely v. Minn.
Tax Com., 137 Minn. 20 (1917); 162 N.W. 675; Shain v. G.N.Ry.Co. 137
Minn. 157 (1917) 162 N.W. 1078; State ex rel Dybdal v. State Sec. Com. 145
Minn. 221, 176 N.W. 759 (1920); State ex rel Saari v. State Sec. Comm. 149
Minn. 101, (1921), 182 N.W. 910; Chica.&N.W.Ry.Co. v. Verschingel, 197
Minn. 580 (1936) 268 N.W. 709; State v. TriState Tel.&Tel.Co., 204 Minn.
516 (1939) 284 N.W. 294.
50 In re Mpls. & St.L.R.R. 297 N.W. 805 (1933); Hardsone Brick Co. case supra
51 "The court does not consider the wisdom or expediency of the order. The court
ascribes to the findings of the commission 'the strength due to judgments of
a tribunal appointed by law and informed by experience' and its conclusion
when supported by substantial evidence, is accepted as final." State v. G. N.
Ry. Co. 135 Minn. 19 (1916) 159 N.W. 1089. "The findings of the commission
are entitled to great weight and we will not disturb them unless they are
manifestly contrary to the evidence Colosimo v. Giacomo, 199 Minn. 600, 602,
(1937) 273 N.W. 632. See also Pechavar v. Oliver Mining Co., 196 Minn. 558
(1936), 265 N.W. 429, 268 N.W. 854. Benson v. Hygenic, Artificial Ice Co.
198 Minn. 250, (1936); 269 N.W. 460. Where there is a conflict in the evi-
dence finding of commission will not be reversed. Foster v. Schmahl, 197 Minn.
602, 607 (1936) 268 N.W. 631; Chamberlain v. Taylor, 198 Minn. 274-6 (1936)
269 N.W. 525; Reinhard v. Univ. Film Exc. 197 Minn., 371, 375 (1936), 267
N.W. 223. "Commission will not be reversed if reasonable minds can draw a
conclusion in harmony with the commission." "Johnson v. Nash-Finch Co., 197
Minn. 616-617 (1936), 268 N.W. 1, Brameld v. Albert Dickinson Co., 186 Minn.
289-292 (1932) 242 N.W. 465.
52 Application of Mpls. Street Ry. (Minn. 1949) 37 N.W. 2d 533-537.
53205 Minn. 410, 286 N.W. 305 (1939).
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whether it proceeded upon a proper theory of law, whether its
action was arbitrary or oppressive, and whether the evidence
affords a reasonable and substantial basis for the order sought to
be reviewed."
The findings of an agency are not only entitled to great weight, but
"the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to such
findings.1 54 Where there is any evidence reasonably tending to sustain
the findings of the director they will not be disturbed on review.
"Fact questions or issues not raised before the commission will not be
consideredsa on review."
The most comprehensive statement on administrative law in the
Minnesota decisions is the opinion in the Tri-State Telephones" rate
case, decided i n1939. Rate making is defined 7 as an inheritently legis-
54 "In reviewing findings of the Industrial Commission our function is not to
determine whether on the facts the decision of the commission is correct or
even preferable to another, but rather and only to determine whether the
findings have sufficient basis of inference reasonably to be drawn from the
facts. . .that the findings of fact of the commission are entitled to very great
weight and... this court will not disturb them unless they are manifestly con-
trary to the evidence... in determining whether the facts and the reasonable
inference to be drawn from them sustain the findings of the industrial com-
mission, the evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to such findings.
Liakos v. Yellow Taxi Co., 225 Minn. 34-39, 29 N.W. 2d, 481-484 "and cases
cited" Judd v. Sanitorium Commission of Hennepin County (1948) 35 N.W.
2d 431-433. "...the findings of the Industrial Commission on questions of fact
will not be disturbed unless a consideration of the evidence and the permissible
inferences require reasonable minds to adopt contrary conclusions." Liakos v.
Yellow Taxi Co. Supra. See also Miller v. Peterson Construction Co., 32 N.W.
2d 48-50 (Minn. 1949); also Hamlin v. Coolerator Co. (Minn. 1949) 35 N.W.
2d 616-622.55 Hamlin v. Coolerator Co. supra. In the case of Chillson v. State Div. of Em-
ployment & Security, 214 Minn. 322, 336, 8 N.W. 42-45, the court said: "In
reviewing an order or determination of an administrative board, the Supreme
Court will go no further than to determine whether the evidence was such
that the board might reasonably make the order or determination which it
made." See also Stepan v. J. C. Campbell Co., 36 N.W. 2d 40 (1949).
55a Nelson v. Reid & Wackman, 36 N.W. 2d 544 (Minn. 1949).
56 State v. Tri-State Telephone Co., 204 Minn. 616, 284 N.W. 294, 300, 303, the
court said: "Due process demands that the rates be fixed only after a hearing
attended by at least the rudiments of fair play. The commission is in conse-
quence required to base its decision upon the evidence and arguments disclosed
at the hearing; its order must be supported by findings of fact which are in
turn sustained by the evidence... (p. 303) the findings of fact are conclusive
provided that the requirements of due process are met by according a fair
hearing and acting upon evidence and not arbitrarily and that in such a case
the judicial inquiry into the facts goes no further than to ascertain whether
there is evidence to support the findings."
57 In the case of Arrow Bus Service Inc. v. Black & White Duluth Cab Co.,(Minn. 1948) 32 N.W. 2d 590, 592, the court said: "The court may not assume
the functions of the commission. To do so would be unconstitutional assump-
tion of legislative powers... In a proper case it may determine the sufficiency
of the evidence to support a finding or examine questions of law arising from
such findings or in rate cases determine whether rates are confiscatory. It
may exercise judicial, but not legislative powers." See also State R.R.&W.H.
Comm. v. M.&St.L.Ry.Co., 209 Minn. 564, 571-2, 297 N.W. 189, 193, also State




lative function. The substantial evidence rule, the requirements of due
process, a fair hearing, decision based on sufficient findings of fact
supported by the record, the weight to be given to agency competence
especially in complicated cases, that the reviewing court can not resolve
conflicting testimony or pass on credibility of witnesses, protection of
right of review, are all set fourth with citations from the Minnesota
as well as from the Federal decisions. The reviewing court can not
encroach on the legislative functions of an administrative agency. The
entire record must be available58 to the reviewing court. Agency findings
can not be based on anything outside of the record.
On questions of policy, the agency's decision is final as this is a
legislative power. The determination of the State Railroad & Ware-
house Commission as to what facilities should be furnished the public
at a particular station is the exercise of a legislative power or a purely
administrative function and will not be disturbed by the reviewing59
58 In the case of Hunter v. Zenith Dredge Co. (Minn. 1945) 19 N.W. 2d 795-799,
where the statute provided that the findings of the medical board were binding
on the commission but the law did not require the findings to be made a part
of the record before the commission, the failure to include the findings in the
record for the reviewing court was held a denial of right of review guaranteed
by the Workmen's Compensation Act and by due process in both the state
and federal constitutions for the reason that the entire record must be avail-
able to the appellate court.
59 In State ex rel, G. N. Ry. Co. 123, Minn. 463, 467, 114 N.W. 155, (1913)
Judge Taylor says: "The question as to what accommodations are reasonably
necessary to afford proper transportation facilities to the public is legislative or
administrative, and not judicial in it's nature; and the courts can interfere
with the action of a body intrusted with the power to determine such questions
only when such action oversteps the limitations, constitutional or otherwise,
placed upon the exercise of such power."
In Brogger v. Chi. St. P., M. & 0. Ry. Co., 137 Minn. 338, 340, 163 N.W. 662,(1917) the court says: "The Legislature has authorized the Railroad & Ware-
house Commission to determine what transportation facilities are reasonably
necessary for the accommodation of the public, and to require railroad com-
panies to furnish such facilities which 'will promote the security and con-
venience of the public.' The power is legislative and administrative in its na-
ture, and, in reviewing the orders of the commission issued thereunder, the
courts can not substitute their own judgment, as to the necessity or propriety
of a proposed change, for that of the commission, but must confine themselves
to determination of the judicial questions committed to them." In St. Joseph's
Stockyards Co. case, supra, Chief Justice Hughes says: "The fixing of rates is
a legislative act. In determining the scope of judicial review of that act, there
is a distinction between action within the sphere of legislative authority and
action which transcends the limits of legislative powers. Exercising its rate
making authority, the legislature has a broad discretion. It may exercise that
authority directly or through the agency it creates or appoints to act for that
purpose in accordance with appropriate standards. The court does not sit as
a board of revision to substitute its judgment for that of the legislature or its
agents. As to maters within the broad field of legislative discretion its deter-
minations are conclusive. When the legislature appoints an agent to act within
that sphere of legislative authority, it may endow the agent with power to
make findings of fact which are conclusive provided the requirements of due
process, which are specifically applicable to such agency are met, as in accord-
ing a fair hearing and acting upon evidence and not arbitrarily. In such cases
the judicial inquiry into the facts goes no farther than to ascertain whether
there is evidence to support the findings and the question of weight of the
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court subject only to the judicial limitations above set forth. Rate
making is a legislative act, as also regulations of a barber board.60
VI.
One of the first states to enact a comprehensive administrative
procedure act is Wisconsin. In 1943, before either the model state act
or the federtl act had been approved, Wisconsin passed a uniform pro-
cedure act covering fully the basic principles of fair administrative
procedure. The Wisconsin act is a scientific codification of state ad-
ministrative law and is more complete than either the state model act
or the federal act. It makes ample provision for the making, amend-
ing, filing and promulgation of agency rules, declaratory orders and
judicial review of the same.0 ' As to procedure in contested cases,
timely notice of hearing, preliminary statement and noticela (plead-
ings) of issues, reasonable rules6 2 of evidence, "official notice 3 of any
generally recognized fact" in the particular agency field, restriction
to official record, sufficiency of findings of fact," are all provided for
in adversary cases.
The agency official who decides must be familiar with the record,
at least by personal consideration of a "summary of the evidence pre-
pared by the person conducting the hearing together with his recom-
mendations as to findings of fact" and opportunity for argument there-
evidence in determining issues of fact lies with the legislative agency acting
within its statutory authority."60 Regulations of a barber board determining qualifications of barbers and teach-
ers in barber colleges are not unconstitutional as an unlawful delegation of
legislative power, the barber board having discretion to interpret the policy
of the statute within reasonable limits to safeguard public health. Lee v. Del-
mont, 36 N.W. 2d 530, (Minn. 1949).
61Wisconsin devotes an entire chapter of its statutes to administrative procedure
and review--chapter 227. Wis. Statute 227.04 to .06 gives a few minor excep-
tions to its act, based upon conditions (local) and special circumstances. These
are cases under the Workmen's Compensation Act, the Unemployment Com-
pensation Act, assessment of public utility property for taxation, and purely
local boards and agencies.
61a In a recent N.D. case the order of the N.D. Public Service Comm. was set
aside because no formal statement or complaint of the claims of the petitioner
had been served on the respondent as required by the N.D. Act. Petition of
Village of Wheatland-N. P. Ry. Co. v. McDonald et al, 42 N.W. 2d 321, (N.D.
Jan. 28, 1950).
62 Wis. Stat. 227.10 "Agencies shall not be bound by common law or statutory
rules of evidence. They shall admit all testimony having reasonable probative
value, but shall exclude immaterial, irrelevant or unduly repetitious testimony
. . Basic principles of relevency, materiality, and probative force, as recog-
nized in equitable proceedings, shall govern the proof of all questions of fact."(italics supplied)63 Wis. Stat. 227.10 (3) "Agencies may take official notice of any generally recog-
nized fact or any established technical or scientific fact." But this may be
contested.
64 Wis. Stat. 227.13. "Decisions. Every decision of an agency in a contested case
shall be in writing, accompanied with findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The findings of fact shall consist of a concise and sepaate statement of the




on by both parties." Right of review is fully provided for." Appeal
may be taken from the reviewing court to the Supreme Court of Wis-
consin. 67
VII.
As to procedure before Minnesota's administrative agencies, there
was no uniform statutory guide until 1945, when state agencies were
empowered to make and amend rules,' s upon notice. By inference only
the new legislation provided for a fair hearing in contested cases, and
findings of fact based upon substantive evidence. The statute does not
specifically cover adversary hearings. No uniform provision is made
for review or for judicial or official agency notice.69 However, the
Minnesota Supreme Court has fully set out the basic principles of
administrative law as hereinabove set forth.
As stated there is in Minnesota no uniform provision for review
of agency or commission orders. For example under the Securities
Division (Blue Sky Law) the only review of an order is by certiorari
from the Supreme Court, the district court is by-passed.70 In proceed-
ings before the R.R. & Warehouse Commission review of final orders
is taken to the district court and under the R.R. & Warehouse Statute
the District Court may take further original testimony before it and
consider such testimony in addition to the record before the Com-
mission.7 However even in this case the general rule of administrative
law is followed and the district court is merely a court of review. The
65 Wis. Stat. 227.12.
6 Wis. Stat. 22720. "The review .. .shall be confined to the record. (1) The court
may affirm the decision of the agency, or may reverse or modify it, if the
substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced as a result of the ad-
ministrative findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions being (a) contrary
to constitutional rights or privileges; or (b) in excess of the statutory author-
ity or jurisdiction of the agency or affected by other errors of law; or (c)
made or promulgated upon unlawful procedure; or (d) unsupported by sub-
stantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted: or (e) arbitrary
or capricious. (2) Upon such review weight shall be accorded the experience,
technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency involved as
well as discretionary authority conferred upon it."6 7 Wis. Stat. 22721. Review of agency decision is taken to the Circuit Court of
Dane County, Wis. (the seat of government) unless otherwise provided in
the particular statute. Under the Wis. Uniform Procedure Act a unified mode
of review is prescribed from all agency or official decisions. Prior to this
statute there were over 70 different statutes prescribing as many different
modes of review.
68 M.S.Sec. 15.041 to 15.049 (Laws 1945 Chap. 452 and 590).
69 Wisconsin Agency Procedure Act, as above stated, is a complete code of ad-
ministrative uniform procedure and review, and Minnesota would do well to
adopt the Wisconsin Act, with such modifications as local conditions might
require. On the other hand Wisconsin, as well as North Dakota, has no logi-
cal or related topical groupings of their state agencies or central fiscal and
managerical control in the interest of economy and efficiency. These states






Minnesota Supreme Court discussing the functions of the district court
on appeal in matters of a policy or legislative nature before the RR. &
Warehouse Commission has said :72
"...The district court does not have the power on appeal or
otherwise to exercise legislative or administrative power. On
appeal from an order of the commission the court examines the
whole matter in controversy to determine whether the evidence
reasonably tends to support the findings of fact upon which the
order must be based and to examine the questions of law arising
from such facts. In deciding an appeal, the court, for lack of
power, does not assume to exercise the functions of the commis-
and to substitute its own findings for those of the commission.
Nor does it act on its own conception of the wisdom of the order
brought before it for review. It decides only the judicial ques-
tions, whether the order is reasonably supported by the evidence
and whether it is lawful and reasonable. It does not try the case
de novo. (italics supplied)
The lawfullnes and reasonableness of the commission' s order is
to be tested by whether it kept within its jurisdiction, whether,
in arriving at its decision it was guided by the controlling rule
of law (in his case the statute) or acted capriciously and at
pleasure, and whether the evidence fairly supports the findings
on which its conclusions rest.. .Its (the district court) appellate
function embraces no power of revision, but only the judicial
power of review to determine for itself, after an examination of
the entire matter in controversy as to both questions of fact and
law, whether the commission's findings of fact, upon which its
order must be based, are reasonably supported by the evidence,
and whether in the light of such factual findings its order is rea-
sonable and lawful."73
VIII.
The proposal for a federal administrative court is now before the
81st Congress through Senator McCarran's bill (S.684) and that of
Congressman Cellar (H.R.466) who are respectively the chairmen of
the Senate and House Committees on the Judiciary. Senator McCarran
with the sponsorship of the American Bar Association was mainly re-
sponsible for the new federal administrative procedure act which was
evolved to improve the administration of justice by insuring to the
average citizen a fair and impartial hearing before the agency. The pro-
72 Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Village of Rush City, (Minn. 1950) 40 N.W. 2d 886,
891.
73Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Village of Rush City (Minn. 1950) id. In this case
the district court set aside and vacated the order of the Railroad & Warehouse
Comm. and the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the District Court.
As to review of agency-rule making and also public hearings prior to agency
rule-making, see the recent and able discussion in Chap. X of Judge Vander-
bilt's work "Minimum Standards of Judicial Administration" (1949) published
by the Law Center of New York University for the National Conference ofjudicial Councils. Judge Vanderbilt recommends a general statutory require-
ment for review of agency rule-making and action for a declaratory judgment.
I assume that our Minnesota declaratory act would be available.
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posed federal administrative court is a necessary and natural corollary
to the administrative act to secure to an aggrieved litigant either a
further hearing in certain cases or a right of appeal to this higher
specialized tribunal.74 Mr. Louis G. Caldwell of the District of Colum-
bia Bar, writing in the American Bar Journal for January 1950, de-
scribes the proposed court as a step in the right direction. He states
the advantages of the new court to be specialization on review or ap-
peal, also promotion of "uniformity both in the substantive and ad-
jective law in the administrative process, including the umpiring of
jurisdictional clashes which so often occur between agencies." Also
a specialized court would afford relief to other overburdened federal
courts not specially qualified to handle administrative disputes. The
present federal courts have naturally sidestepped an intense and de-
tailed review of agency hearings and decisions. Mr. Caldwell says :71
"In a large measure the courts have denied themselves the power
to review determinations of these agencies almost entirely on
issues of fact and to some extent on issues of law. Although the
Constitution was usually invoked as a reason, I venture to say
that a most important factor in this self denial was a sense of in-
adequacy for such burdens and a reluctance so greatly to in-
crease the judicial work load. This can be read between the lines
in several Supreme Court decisions. These three advantages, ex-
pertness through specialization, development toward uniformity,
and relief of the federal courts seem to me to amply justify this
comparatively mild and cautious experiment."
As far back as 1929 Marvin B. Rosenberry, the scholarly Chief Justice
74 Senator McCarran's proposed court would consist of 5 judges appointed as
other federal judges except that the appointees would have special qualifica-
tion of training and experience in administrative as well as other law.
None of such appointees would within 5 years of his appointment have been an
officer or employee of the executive branch of the government because among
other things such judges would be obliged to disqualify themselves in many
cases and would lead people to feel that such a court would be unduly partial
to government agencies. The jurisdiction of the court would be confined, to
agency matters although not exclusive of other federal courts. "The procedure
of the court would be of two kinds, for each kind it would be similar to that
with which we are all familiar. When the court sits as a trial court, it would
operate like other trial courts-with one or more judges, etc. It would also
be a reviewing or appellate court in the same fashion as other courts-with
three or more judges sitting in a case. In other words there would be nothing
unusual about the method and procedure in the court. It might operate any-
where in the country, however depending upon the needs of its business as
time goes on. In appropriate cases as required by the Constitution, and in any
case in which the Court would fail to afford equal protection to the parties
before it, appeals could be taken to the Supreme Court in the same fashion
as in other cases in other courts." (95 Cong. Record 573, 575). In no event
would the new court supersede the Court of Claims, the Customs and Patent
Courts or the Tax Court. We are advised by Senator McCarran's office that
this bill for the proposed court will not be reached by the present Congress.
* 36 Am. Bar Assoc. Journal p. 13, 83. (Jan. 1950).
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of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, writing in the Political Science
Review envisaged the need of an administrative court. He said:
"That the development of administrative law must stop short of
combining in one person or group, legislative, executive, and
judicial power which may be exercised arbitrarily, without pre-
serving to the party claiming to be deprived of his life, liberty,
or property, a right of review, appears axiomatic. It seems prob-
able that the matter will be worked out by way of constitutional
amendment, permitting the creation of a court comparable to
the French Council of State, in order that highly technical and
complex questions involved in administrative law may be re-
viewed by a competent tribunal."
76
The doctrine of the separation of powers and the prohibition of delega-
tion of legislative power conflict with the powers that are conceded
necessary to governmental agencies. The task of the federal admin-
istrative procedure act recently adopted and Senator McCarran's pro-
posed federal administrative court is to control and limit these admin-
istrative commissions, bureaus and agencies so as to keep a proper
balance between the public welfare and individual right. At the state
level this should be done by state administrative procedure acts (which
have been enacted in a number of states) and the state courts. In the
leading Wisconsin case of State ex rel. Wis. Inspection Bureau et al v.
Whitman, State Comn'r of Ins.7 7 Judge Rosenberry explores the field
of agency powers. He says:
"The essential fact upon which courts, legislatures, and execu-
tives, as well as students of law agree, is that there is an over-
powering necessity for modification of the doctrine of separation
and non-delegation of powers of government. In the face of
that necessity, courts have upheld laws granting legislative
power under the guise of the power to make rules and regula-
tions, have upheld laws delegating judicial power under the
guise of the power to find facts. As Mr. Root said: 'The old
doctrine prohibiting the delegation of legislative power has vir-
tually retired from the field and given up the fight. There will
be no withdrawal from these experiments. We shall go on,
whether we approve theoretically or not, because such agencies
furnish protection to rights and obstacles to wrong doing which
under our new social and industrial conditions cannot be prac-
tically accomplished by the old and simple procedure of legisla-
tures and Courts as in the last generation. 'The public interest
would be greatly advanced and our law clarified, if the situation
as it exists were frankly recognized and an attempt made by all
departments of the government to guard against the dangers
foreseen by Montesquieu and apprehended by every thoughtful
student of the subject. For there can be no doubt that, in sus-
- Vol. 23 American Political Science Review p. 32, 43 (Feb. 1929).
77 196 Wis. 472, 220 N.W. 929 (1928).
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taining laws which combine legislative and judicial power in a
single administrative agency, we are on the way back to where
we were when the doctrine of the separarion of powers was
enunciated as a political theory, and before it had been wrought
into our constitutional system. . .It is considered that the con-
situtional aspects of administraive law have been so far de-
veloped by statute and decision as to indicate in a general way
the line which separates that kind of legislative power which
may not be delegated from that kind which may be delegated.
The power to declare whether or not there shall be a law; to de-
termihe the purpose or policy to be achieved by the law; to fix
the limits within which the law shall operate is a power which
is vested by our Constitution in the Legislature and may not be
delegated. When, however, the Legislature has laid down these
fundamentals of a law, it may delegate to administrative agencies
the authority to exercise such legislative power as is necessary
to carry into effect the general legislative purpose; in the lan-
guage of Chief Justice Marshall, 'to fill up the details'; in the
language of Chief Justice Taft, 'to make public regulations in-
terpreting the statute and directing details of its execution.' It
is legislative power of the later kind which is oftentimes called
the rule-making power of boards, bureaus, and commssions...
the delegation of power to subordinate administrative agencies
is fraught with danger, for the reason that it introduces into our
system of governmental agency which may exercise some of the
powers of each of the co-ordinate departments of government in
combination. As was pointed out by Mr. Dicey, there will re-
main two checks upon the abuse of power by administrative
agencies. In the first place, every such agency must conform
precisely to the statute which grants the power; secondly, such
delegated powers must be exercised in a spirit of judicial fair-
ness and equity and not oppressively and unreasonably.. .The
doors of the courts of this country will stand open to any citizen
complaining that he has been deprived of his constitutional
rights, no matter under what form of law the deprivation has
been worked. The emergence of administrative agencies will not
impair or destroy the checks and balances of the Constitution.
To these two may be added a third check, one which seems to
us is frequently overlooked, and that is that all of these adminis-
trative agencies are creatures of the Legislature and are respon-
sible to it. Consequently the Legislature may withdraw powers
which have been granted, prescribe the procedure through which
granted powers are exercised, and if neccessary, wipe out the
agency entirely. . .For these and other reasons, it seems much
wiser to permit administrative law to develop in our constitu-
tional system slowly and in an orderly way rather than to at-
tempt to achieve it at a single bound by constitutional amend-
ment."
Ix.
From the foregoing survey we conclude that administrative law,
as now reformed and revised pursuant to the recent federal and state
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administrative acts, is implemented to assure to private persons demo-
cratic participation in rule-making, reasonable availibility and publicity
of agency processes and their rules and regulations. As to procedural
agency action there is guaranteed a fair hearing at the trial level, with
right of review. The federal act78 as we have stated purposes, signifi-
cantly, to prescribe "fair administrative procedure." The fundamen-
tals of fair procedure come within the purview of the "due process"
clauses of our state and federal constitutions. Hence the inquiry: what
is due process9 as applied to procedure before administrative agencies?
The most satisfactory answer that we have been able to find, is that
given by Chief Justice Gallagher of the Minnesota Supreme Court in
the Zenith Dredge Compan ° case decided in 1945. He said:
"The words 'due process of law' when applied to judicial pro-
ceedings mean a course of legal conduct consonant with rules
and principles established in our system of jurisprudence for
the protection and enforcement of private rights. Due process
requires notice before judgment, an opportunity to be heard in
an orderly proceeding adapted to the nature of the case and the
right of appeal or review of a decision regarded by a litigant as
unjust."
A more inclusive delimitation of the "due process of law clause" in
the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments may be deduced from the opin-
ion of Judge Burke of the North Dakota Supreme Court in the case
of State v. Magrum8' (June 13, 1949) which is that procedure or lack
thereof that is "offensive to the common fundamental ideas of fairness
and right," is a violation of due process of law. The concept "due
process of law" is based on natural justice or the Natural Law. A
partial application of this general principle is expressed by Judge
Vanderbilt, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New Jersey, as
follows :82
7s60 U.S. Stat. 237:5 U.S.C.A. sec. 1001 et seq. (1946).
79 Professor Corwin discussing the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment,
says: "From the point of view of constitutional limitations on power and so
from the point of view of the control exercised by the Supreme Court, through
review, upon the powers of government, whether state or national, in the
United States, this clause and its companion piece, the 'due process of law'
clause of Amednment XIV are the most important clauses of the Constitution.
Originally 'due process of law' meant simply the modes of procedure which
were due at the common law. Today 'due process of law' means 'reasonable'
law or 'reasonable procedure', that is to say, what a majority of the Supreme
Court find to be reasonable in some or other sense of that extremely elastic
term. In other words it means in effect, the approval of the Supreme Court."
Corwin: "The Constitution and What it Means Today. 9th ed. p. 168-170.(1947).
so Hunter v. Zenith Dredge Company (Minn. 1945) 19 N.W. 2d 795-799.
81 State v. Magrum, 38 N.W. 2d 358, 360; see also cases cited.
82 "Mininmum Standards of Judicial Administration." (1949) by Judge Vanderbilt.




"Perhaps the fundamental principle upon which justice in the
Common-law world is based is the right to be heard-audi
partem. 'It is a rule founded upon the first principles of natural
justice, older than written constitutions, that a citizen shall not
be deprived of his life, liberty, or property without an opportu-
nity to be heard in defense of his rights and the constitutional
provision that no person shall be deprived of these without due
process of law has its foundation in this rule.' Implicit in this
is the requirement of due notice as a condition precedent to the
proper exercise of the administrative power. The right to a
hearing, however generously preserved, is of little use, unless
those affected are informed beforehand of the contemplated ac-
tion. Notice in short must be given, and it must fairly indicate
what the respondent is to meet." (emphasis supplied)
X
POSTLUDE
The foregoing outline of administrative agencies and the need for
their control by the courts leads us back to the fundamental principles
of jurisprudence. Modern positivism has, during the last generation,
attempted to undermine the basic moral principles of our American
constitutional government, founded and builded, as it is, on the Na-
tural Law.83 In this particular we quote from an address by Federal
District Judge, Robert N. Wilkin, of Cleveland, Ohio, delivered in
December 1948. He said :84
"Any lawyer whose professional career began during the first
ten years of the present century and who is still alive and able to
note the trends of current thought, witnessed two great changes
in the philosophy of jurisprudence. When he came to the bar,
Coke, Blackstone,, Kent, Story, Minor, and Cooley were still re-
spected sources of legal learning, and the Natural Law phil-
osophy of the Founding Fathers was unquestioned. But during
the ensuing thirty years there was a great shift from these au-
thorities and that philosophy to what has come to be known as
83 Sir William Blackstone in his Commentaries (Book I, p. 39, 40, 42 et passim)
says: "This law of nature being coeval with mankind and dictated by God,
Himself, is of course superior in obligation to any other. It is binding over
all the globe, in all countries, and at all times: no human laws are of any
validity if contrary to this: and such of them as are valid derive all their
force and all their authority mediately or immediately from this original...
Providence... in compassion to the frailty, the imperfection and the blindness
of human reason, hath been pleased, at sundry times and in divers manners
to discover and enforce its laws by an immediate and direct revelation. (e.g.
the ten commandments).. .Uporr these two foundations, the law of nature and
the law of revelation, depend all human laws: that is to say, no human laws
should be suffered to contradict these." A short definition of natural law is
given by Holaind.S.J. "Natural Law and Legal Practice" (1899) as follows:
"Natural Law is a body of moral principles which reason itself teaches, and
which are binding on all men."
84 Univ. of Notre Dame "Natural Law Institute Proceedings 1948. Vol. 11, 125.
24 Notre Dame Lawyer 343 (1949).
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modem positivism or realism. And now within the last eight or
ten years there are unmistakable signs of dissatisfaction over
the insufficiency, the aridity, of modern positivism, and very
definite indications of a revival of Natural Law philosophy.. .It
is unnecessary to trace in detail the extent or the effect of posi-
tivism during the early decades of this century. That has been
well done by Dean Pound, Mr. Ben Palmer, Mr. Harold McKin-
non, Mrs. C. P. Ives, and others. As Mr. McKinnon says :85
'This teaching (positivism) nullifies the Declaration of Indepen-
dence, the preamble of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.
It nullifies twenty-five hundred years of progress in political
and legal theory and re-enacts in the present age some of the
worst political and legal errors of ancient times. It is indisting-
uishable, in its origin and its logical effect, from the philoso-
phies which have characterized lands against which we have just
fought the bloodiest war in history.' In this century positivism
tended to discredit the judicial function and over-emphasize the
importance of administrative procedure. The fiat rule of ad-
ministrative boards was substituted quite extensively for legal
procedure of courts. Precedent was disregarded, balance of
power was scoffed at; and the Constitution was openly flouted
. . .The critical problems of our national life today have come
directly from this materialistic and positivist attitude toward
life and law. When the ethical and moral content of our phil-
osophy was abandoned, men felt free to assert without restraint
their novel theories and their personal class selfishness, avarice
and greed. As a result of this disrespect for courts and the
judicial process there followed a corresponding neglect of the
common interest and public welfare. (emphasis supplied). The
sole aim in life of most men was profits or wages, and the
affairs of government were abandoned to policy amateurs or
self-seeking politicians who bartered and traded for self-ag-
grandizement and success of party, bloc, or union. Disputes
between the great monopolies of employers and unions led to
strikes which paralyzed the economic life of the country. Agents
of government merely pampered and pandered instead of en-
forcing the established principles of law which for centuries had
protected the community interest."
8 5 Harold R. McKinnon of the San Francisco Bar; 33 A.B.A.J. 106, 966 (1947).
In his thesis entitled "The Higher Law" Mr. McKinnon traces the history of
the Natural Law doctrine from Aristotle and others among the Greeks, Cicero
and other Roman Jurists, including Gains, Ulpian and Justinian; throught the
early Fathers of the Christian Church, Saints Paul, Augustine, Ambrose andJerome. In the middle ages he states: "The outstanding thinker of this period
was the great medieval philosopher St. Thomas Aquinas, who wrote that the
rational creature, being subject to Divine Providence, has a share of Eternal
Reason. 'whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper act and end: and
this participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is called the na-
tural law.' According to St. Thomas, therefore, all men made laws must con-form to this law of nature, and 'if at any point (a man made law) is in con-
flict with the law of nature, it at once ceases to be a law; it is a mere per-
version of law." "As a result of teaching such as this, it was recognized
throughout the middle ages, that the natural law was antecedent and para-
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Finally, Dean Roscoe Pound, lecturing before the students of Notre
Dame University, in June 1942, had this to say about uncontrolled
administrative orders.80
"To autocrats and dictators law is anathema. To them, it is
unthinkable that those who exercise the power of a politically
organized society are to rule, as the medieval put it, under God
and the law... (a) substitute for law preached by the late jur-
istic adviser of the Soviet government in Russia, may be called
administrative absolutism. There is to be no law, or rather only
one rule of law, namely, that there are no laws but only admin-
istrative ordinances and orders. This doctrine has been urged
throughout the world with the rise of absolute governments and
has been making headway in the English-speaking world with
the rise of administrative agencies controlling every form of
enterprise and activity... It is significant that the Russian jurist
who urged a regime of administrative orders is no longer with
us. He was eliminated in the 'purge' a few years since. If there
had been law at hand, and not merely administrative orders, he
might have lost only his job and not his life as well."
mount to the state in every way, and that it stood above all earthly powers,
above king and emperor, above pope and people. . .From medieval sources it
came to England, where it characterized the writings of such men as Hooker
and Sydney and of the jurists Bracton and Fortescue, Coke and Blackstone
and Pollock. Finally it came to America, where it permeated the writings of
the Founding Fathers--of Wilson and Hamilton, of Adams, Dickinson and
Otis; while from the jen of Jefferson it received classic and let us hope im-
mortal expression in the famous preamble to the Declaration of Independence
that all men are created equal and that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain inalienable rights and that the purpose of government is to secure these
rights."
Notre Dame Lawyer, Vol. 17 p. 287, 326-7.
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